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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose to detect forged videos, of faces,
in online videos. To facilitate this detection, we propose to
use smaller (fewer parameters to learn) convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNN), for a data-driven approach to forged
video detection. To validate our approach, we investigate the
FaceForensics public dataset detailing both frame-based and
video-based results. The proposed method is shown to out-
perform current state of the art. We also perform an ablation
study, analyzing the impact of batch size, number of filters,
and number of network layers on the accuracy of detecting
forged videos.
Index Terms— Deep fake, CNN, videos, deep learning
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been tremendous progress in manip-
ulating videos, which includes real-time generation, use of
audio to synthesize videos, and animating static images. This
can undermine applications of biometrics, affective comput-
ing, and forms of digital communication such as social media
videos and teleconferences. Considering this, we propose a
solution to detect forged (i.e. fake) facial videos, using convo-
lutional neural networks (CNN) that are much smaller (fewer
parameters to learn) than the current state-of-the-art solutions.
The use of smaller networks has the advantage of having less
parameters while still being able to learn complex functions
similar to deeper networks [3].
Detecting fake facial videos can broadly be categorized
into 3 categories (physical, signal, and data-driven). Physi-
cal approaches tend to focus on features of the face such as
eye blinking and head pose. Li et al. [9] used a combina-
tion of CNNs and long-term recurrent CNNs to analyze eye
blinks. They show that blinking is not well represented in
the fake videos, which their proposed network takes advan-
tage of for detection. Yang et al. [19] used a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) along with 3D head pose to detect fake face
videos. They found that the landmark locations between the
original and fake videos differ, due to the synthesis methods
used to create the fake videos. For synthesizing videos, Suwa-
janakorn et al. [17] investigated synthesizing video from au-
dio around the mouth region. They note that there can be in-
consistencies between the lips and speech as they may not be
synchronized, resulting in an area of the face for analysis of
fake videos (i.e. the mouth can be used, similar to eye blink-
ing). Agarwal et al. [2] captured behavioral patterns, from 2D
facial landmarks, of individuals to detect Deep Fake videos.
From these landmarks, they investigate the occurrence and in-
tensity of Facial Action Units [5], training an SVM, with this
data, to detect fake video sequences.
Signal-based approaches tend to focus on artifacts that are
introduced during the Deep Fake synthesis (creation) phase.
Matern et al. [11] showed that visual artifacts such as changes
in eye color can be reliably exploited to detect fake videos.
They characterize the differences in eye color based on the
HSV color space, which is used along with a bagged version
of k-nearest neighbors, to detect fake face videos. Li et al.
[10], developed an approach motivated by the idea that Deep
Fake generation algorithms have a limited resolution and re-
quire warping. They showed that CNNs can capture this in-
formation to distinguish between fake and real videos.
Data-driven approaches are generally simpler in that they
dont look for specific artifacts but focus on large amounts
of training data that contains both real and Deep Fake data.
Guera et al. [7] used convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
to extract frame-level features which are then used to train a
recurrent neural network to detect whether a video has been
manipulated or not. They show that their proposed approach
can detect fake vs. real videos with less than 2 seconds of
data. Nguyen et al. [12] used capsule networks [16] to detect
forged videos that include replay attacks [13], as well as com-
puter generated (e.g. Generative Adversarial Networks [6]).
They showed that by adding random Gaussian noise to their
network, then can improve the detection accuracy.
The proposed approach to detecting forged facial videos
can be categorized as data-driven and is motivated by the
works detailed here. Our main contributions are 3-fold and
can be summarized as follows:
1. A CNN that has fewer parameters to learn is proposed
to detect fake face videos. We report frame- and video-
level results.
2. Proposed network outperforms current state of the art
on the FaceForensics [15] dataset.
3. Details on the impact of batch size, number of filters,
and number of network layers (i.e. ablation study) on
the accuracy of detecting fake face videos are given.
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Fig. 1. Overview of proposed CNN architecture.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To detect fake face videos, we propose to use a convolutional
neural network (CNN) that is smaller (i.e. less parameters to
learn) compared to other state-of-the-art works for detecting
fake face videos [15]. To evaluate our proposed CNN, we
conduct experiments on the publicly available FaceForensics
datasets [15]. Details on our proposed network architecture
and this dataset are given in the following subsections.
2.1. Convolutional Neural Network Architecture
Our proposed CNN, has 5 layers with 58, 221 parameters.
This is compared to other works [15] that use XCeptionNet
[4], which has 71 layers and approximately 23 million param-
eters. In our network, the first 4 blocks represent 2D convolu-
tions, with 4 filters of size 3× 3 for each convolutional layer.
Batch normalization follows each convolutional layer, with
a final dense layer of size 1. The Adam optimizer [8] with
a learning rate of 0.001 was used along with binary cross-
entropy as the loss function, and accuracy as the evaluation
metric. A batch size of 128 was used and the network was
trained for 10 epochs. We implemented early stopping when
the difference in validation accuracy was less than 0.01. As
the network outputs a probability between [0, 1], we imple-
ment a threshold where any value < 0.5 is classified as origi-
nal and any value ≥ 0.5 is classified as fake. In Section 3, we
detail the impact of batch size, number of filters and layers, on
the proposed architecture’s ability to detect fake face videos.
See Figure 1 for an overview of the proposed architecture.
2.2. FaceForensics Dataset
The FaceForensics dataset [15] consists of 1004 videos that
have a resolution greater than 480p from the youtube8m [1]
dataset. Videos that were tagged with labels such as ”face”
were selected for the dataset. Face2Face [18] was used to
create the face forgery videos (called altered videos) from the
parent videos (called original videos). As such, there is per-
fect class balance in the dataset between altered and origi-
Fig. 2. Sample images from the FaceForensics dataset [15].
Left: original, right: fake.
Table 1. Confusion matrix for frame-based results on entire
testing set from the FaceForensics dataset [15].
Detected Original Detected Fake
Ground Truth Original .999 .001
Ground Truth Fake .007 .993
nal videos. The FaceForensics dataset is split into training,
validation, and testing sets that includes 736,270 samples of
training data sourced from 704 videos, 151,052 samples of
validation data sourced from 150 videos, and 155,490 sam-
ples of testing data sourced from 150 videos. The aforemen-
tioned frame count values are split evenly between altered and
original videos resulting in a balanced dataset of original and
forged videos. For our experiments, we used all of the data
in the training, validation, and testing sets. See Figure 2 for
examples of an original and fake image from this dataset.
3. RESULTS
To evaluate the utility of the proposed CNN to detect fake
videos, we conducted frame- and video-based experiments.
We also evaluated the impact of batch size, the number of
filters, and the number of convolutional layers.
3.1. Frame-based Results
As noted in Section 2.2, the FaceForensics dataset contains
pre-sorted training, validation and testing sets. To conduct
our experiments, we trained our proposed network (Section
2.1) on the entire training set, and here we report our frame-
based results (i.e. individual detection result for each video
frame) on the entire testing set (155, 490 images). Using the
proposed CNN, we achieve an accuracy of 99.6%, where 627
images were misclassified. As can be seen in Table 1, a small
percentage of frames where misclassified as fake, when they
were original (70 frames). While more frames were misclas-
sified as original, when they were fake (557 frames), the over-
all accuracy is high for both, showing the proposed smaller
CNN is robust to detect fake face videos.
Fig. 3. Consecutive frames from the 1 misclassified video.
Ground truth of video is fake. Left: misclassified as original,
right: correctly classified as fake.
Table 2. Confusion matrix for video-based results on entire
testing set from the FaceForensics dataset [15].
Detected Original Detected Fake
Ground Truth Original 1 0
Ground Truth Fake .007 .993
3.2. Video-based Results
To conduct our video-based experiments (i.e. detect whether
a video is fake or not), we followed the same experimental
design as our frame-based detection, however, we also imple-
mented majority voting for each video. For each video, the
final classification (real or fake) is calculated by summing up
the total classifications for each frame. The classification with
the majority of frames labeled as such, is determined to be the
final classification. Using majority voting results in a video-
based accuracy of 99.67%, on the 150 testing videos, with
only 1 video being misclassified. As can be seen in Table 2,
1 video was detected as original, when it has a ground truth
label of fake. As we used majority voting for our video-based
detection, this video was incorrectly classified as 53% of the
frames were classified as original.
To gain further insight into why this video was misclas-
sified, we computed a histogram of the probabilities for each
frame in this video. As can be seen in Figure 4, the network
was largely confident in it’s predictions with 189 having a
probability of 0 (original), and 217 frames having a prob-
ability of 1 (fake). The misclassification occurred, in part,
due to the probabilities that were not 0 or 1, where a total
of 90 frames were also classified as original, however, with
a lower probability. It is also interesting to note that this
video contributed to 45% of the misclassified frames from
Section 3.1 (270 out of 627 total misclassified frames). Figure
3 shows two consecutive frames from this misclassified video.
The frame on the left was misclassified as original, while the
frame on the right was correctly classified as fake. As can be
seen in this figure, visually the frames look similar, however,
the network had different classification labels for each.
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Fig. 4. Histogram of probabilities from misclassified video.
Table 3. Impact of batch size on accuracy when training pro-
posed network for 1 epoch.
Batch Size
Training
Accuracy
Validation
Accuracy
Testing
Accuracy
64 0.8394 0.8137 0.8051
128 0.8463 0.8145 0.8009
256 0.8176 0.5450 0.5627
512 0.7525 0.6870 0.6987
1024 0.6843 0.6096 0.5796
3.3. Impact of Fine-tuning CNN Architecture
To evaluate the robustness of the proposed network, we con-
ducted experiments to investigate the impact of batch size,
number of filters and number of convolutional layers.
Convolutional Layers. We evaluated the proposed net-
work using 1, 2, 3, and 4 convolutional layers using 4 filters
of size 3 × 3, with a batch size of 64. The number of layers
had little impact on the overall accuracy. As can be seen in
Figure 5, increasing the number of layers from 1 to 4 shows an
increase for each layer added, however, this increase is < 3%
when comparing the lowest accuracy of 96.9% with 1-layer
to the max accuracy of 99.3% with 4-layers. These results
are encouraging, showing the robustness of smaller CNNs to
detect fake face videos.
Batch Size. Batch size in a CNN can impact the time to
converge, as well as overfitting of the network [14]. Consid-
ering this, we evaluated the impact of batch size on accuracy
by training our proposed network for one epoch with varying
batch sizes. We chose one epoch as the main goal of this in-
vestigation is to find trends in the accuracy compared to the
batch size. As can be seen in Table 3, batch sizes of 256
and higher tend to have poor validation and testing accura-
cies. While a larger batch size can result in faster training
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Fig. 5. Impact of number of convolutional layers, on accu-
racy, in the proposed network.
Table 4. Impact of number of filters on accuracy when train-
ing proposed network for 1 epoch. NOTE: * denotes inferred
accuracy based on results from 8 filters, due to time required
to train networks with larger filter sizes.
Number of
Filters
Training
Accuracy
Validation
Accuracy
Testing
Accuracy
4 0.7029 0.8080 0.6919
8 0.4999 0.5002 0.500
256 0.5002 0.5002 0.500*
512 0.5002 0.5002 0.500*
1024 0.5002 0.5002 0.500*
time [20], this has to be balanced with reduced accuracy.
Filter Size. Similar to the conducted experiments on the
impact of batch size, we also trained our proposed network
for one epoch. This was done, as again we are looking for
trends in the accuracy compared to filter sizes. As can be
seen in Table 4, when the number of filters is 4, we achieve
the highest accuracy. This is also reflected in our final results,
as 4 filters were used for the results shown in Sections 3.1 and
3.2. Increasing the number of filters to 8 results in significant
decrease in accuracy (∼ 20%), however, once the number of
filters is ≥ 256, we see the accuracies converge to approx-
imately 50% on both training and validation. Because the
larger batch sizes we tested (≥ 256) needed 1-3 days to train,
we inferred the accuracy of the testing sets for these number
of filters based on the accuracy of using 8 filters.
3.4. Comparisons to State of the Art
Ro¨ssler et al. [15] conducted experiments on the FaceForen-
sics dataset using a subset of the available data. They se-
Table 5. Accuracies (per epoch) of replicated XceptionNet
architecture on entire FaceForensics training, validation, and
testing sets. NOTE: even numbered epochs shown for brevity,
but all epochs had same validation/testing accuracies.
Epoch
Training
Accuracy
Validation
Accuracy
Testing
Accuracy
2 0.9987 0.5 0.5
4 0.9993 0.5 0.5
6 0.9995 0.5 0.5
8 0.9996 0.5 0.5
10 0.9997 0.5 0.5
lected 20 frames (10 original and 10 fake) from each of the
704 available videos in the training set. They also selected
20 frames from each of the 150 validation and testing videos.
To conduct their experiments, they used XceptionNet [4] by
freezing the first 36 layers and replacing the last layer with
a dense layer of 2 nodes (original and fake). They trained
the network for 10 epochs using the Adam optimizer with a
learning rate of 0.001 and a batch size of 64. They achieved
an accuracy of 99.3%, compared to ours of 99.6%.
As a subset of the data was used for this experiment, we
are interested in how using XceptionNet, with these changes,
would impact the accuracy on the entire training, validation,
and testing sets as we did in our experimental design. Consid-
ering this, we replicated this experimental design using Xcep-
tionNet (freezing first 36 layers, new dense layer, training for
10 epochs) and trained on the entire training set. This resulted
in an accuracy of 50% for both the validation and testing sets.
As can be seen in Table 5, the training accuracy for this archi-
tecture was high (> 99%) for all epochs, however, the valida-
tion and testing accuracies converged to 50% for all epochs.
These results further validate the robustness of using a smaller
network, compared to a larger one, to detect fake face videos.
4. CONCLUSION
We proposed the use of a smaller (less parameters to learn)
CNN for detecting fake face videos. We investigate both
frame- and video-based approaches to this problem achieving
accuracies of 99.6% and 99.67%, respectively, on the Face-
Forensics dataset [15]. We show state-of-the-art results and
validation of the chosen hyperparameters (e.g. batch size,
number of filters) for the proposed network. Due to the in-
crease, in recent years, of manipulated videos, this work has
broader impacts in security and digital communication.
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